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How central banks cope with price instabilities: Ambiguous inflation targets as organizational compromise
| dc.rights.license | Creative Commons | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Duterme, T. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-04-02T09:16:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-04-02T09:16:22Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://luck.synhera.be/handle/123456789/3039 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scaman.2025.101406 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | EN | en_US |
| dc.publisher | 41(1) | en_US |
| dc.subject | Inflation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Central Bank | en_US |
| dc.subject | Device | en_US |
| dc.subject | Organization | en_US |
| dc.subject | Pragmatism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social Studies of Finance | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Inflation | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Central Bank | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Device | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Organization | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Pragmatism | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Social Studies of Finance | en_US |
| dc.title | How central banks cope with price instabilities: Ambiguous inflation targets as organizational compromise | en_US |
| dc.title.en | How central banks cope with price instabilities: Ambiguous inflation targets as organizational compromise | en_US |
| dc.type | Article scientifique | en_US |
| synhera.institution | ICHEC-ECAM-ISFSC | en_US |
| synhera.stakeholders.fund | ICHEC | en_US |
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